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Human Enhancement for the Common Good
prior knowledge or irrational beliefs, such an enhancement
would operate as regulation of thought, arguably not res-
cued by its short duration because of the fundamental na-
ture of the right.
As stated, it is commendable and arguably even obliga-
tory to imagine ways to produce a fairer and more just soci-
ety in view of the human predicament. Applying mandatory
interventions to eliminate unjust results based on inaccurate
eyewitness testimony rights some wrongs but also wrongs
some rights. The utilitarian appeal loses ground, given the
limitations in achieving the intended objective. If, in theory,
we are not prepared to force witnesses to consume truth
serum before testifying, justification on the basis of the com-
mon good can demand little more than the fortification of
social norms and development of stiff sanctions for failures
to exercise due care in supporting the necessarily collective
effort toward just outcomes.
While Vedder and Klaming have identified a common
good much in need of our collective and individual best ef-
forts, cognitive enhancement for law enforcement purposes
carries a heavy cost. If it is used in one case, it must be
used in all and so must be mandatory. Moreover, ultimately
such an intervention compels innocent persons to relinquish
among the most fundamental freedoms, thus undermining
the foundations of a free society. 
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Enhancing Eyewitness Memory in a
Rape Case
Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu, Australian National University
In their article, Vedder and Klaming (2010) advocate cog-
nitive enhancement for the common good. They claim that
“Instead of asking whether cognitive enhancement is ac-
ceptable, we should ask under what conditions it is accept-
able or desirable” (22). The answer they supply to the ques-
tion they pose is that cognitive enhancement is acceptable
or desirable on the condition that it is done for the purpose
of common good. Let us call this view the common good thesis.
According to the authors, a good case to illustrate the
common good thesis is the case of using neurotechnology
to enhance an eyewitness’s memory of the criminal scene.
For, according to the authors, the “primary objective” of the
enhancement of eyewitness memory is “the delivery of ac-
curate evidence” and “it therefore potentially benefits the
society as a whole” (22). By contrasting the enhancement of
eyewitness memory with general cognitive enhancement,
the authors contend that although the latter is often done
for a self-serving purpose such as enhancing one’s IQ, the
former is done for the purpose of common good. To be more
specific, according to the authors, the enhancement of eye-
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witness memory can benefit “several agents including law
enforcement officials, innocent suspects and eyewitnesses”
(22). Such being the case, the authors favor the enhancement
of eyewitness memory.
Now, some comments are in place here. I think that
the authors fail to consider an apparently fatal objection
to their advocacy of enhancing eyewitness memory even
in the name of common good. Imagine the following case.
Suppose that woman X is raped by Y. At the criminal scene,
she is the only witness. Yet she is so traumatized by her
experience that she suppresses her memory of the rape into
oblivion and completely forgets what Y looks like. Suppose
further that, according to her doctor, recalling or enhanc-
ing her memories of the event might cause an emotional
breakdown and make it difficult for X to carry on with her
life. Are the authors prepared to endorse eyewitness mem-
ory enhancement in a rape case like this? Unfortunately,
the authors do not tell us in their article. However, this is an
important question. To answer it might require us to balance
the risks involved to the eyewitness, X in our current case,











































against the common good the enhancement of eyewitness
memory might produce.
Admittedly, in some cases, the enhancement of eyewit-
ness memory might produce common good in the way the
authors describe in their article—that is, it might help to
clear the names of convicted innocents or help the police
get the real criminal, etc. However, in other cases, it might
not. It is not difficult to imagine that the real criminal has
facial surgery such that enhanced memory of the criminal’s
face is not much help to the police or that the convicted
innocent has great physical resemblance to the real crimi-
nal such that it is hard to distinguish them even with en-
hanced eyewitness memory. Then, given the uncertainty of
the common good and given the high risks to woman X that
the enhancement of eyewitness memory involves, it is not
clear to me that enhancing eyewitness memory is the right
thing to do in the rape case I described, not even in the name
of common good.
True, at one place of their article, the authors mention
that securing informed consent from the eyewitness is a fac-
tor that needs to be considered. It may well be necessary to
secure the informed consent of the eyewitness before we can
proceed with eyewitness memory enhancement. However,
in the rape case I presented, it is not clear that the eyewitness,
being the victim herself, is capable of giving informed con-
sent. In the rape case we are currently considering, the rape
victim may well be so traumatized such that her decision
to consent can hardly count as being well-informed. Kolber
(2006, 1587) rightly points out that “Almost by definition
traumatized [victims] will have some level of psychological
disturbance that may cloud their decision to consent.” Due
to the rape victim’s psychological disturbance, she might
not be able to understand clearly and fully what sort of
consequences recalling the memory of the rape might in-
volve. Or she might well underestimate the probability of
collapsing into a severe state of emotional depression. Such
being the case, we have reason to suspect that even if she
consents to eyewitness memory enhancement, her consent
is not well-informed. It is not difficult to imagine that were
she in a clear mindset, or had she not had the psychological
disturbance caused by her traumatizing experience of be-
ing raped, we would have a much clearer case of informed
consent. However, the case we are currently considering is
not so clear. This should cause some alarm in us, because
in real-world practices, “many important medical decisions
are made when patients are severely emotionally shaken,
yet the patients are considered competent to make them”
(Tenenbaum and Reese 2007, 41; Kolber 2006, 1588). Such
being the case, we have reason to doubt whether securing
the “informed consent” of the rape victim can really justify
enhancing eyewitness memory in the rape case. I do not
think that the appeal to considerations of informed consent
can obviate my concern that undue harm might be inflicted
on the rape victim in the name of common good. 
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The Common Good: A Neutral
Yardstick?
Laurens Landeweerd, Faculty of Health, Medicine, and Life Sciences, Maastricht
University
Standard defenses of enhancement technologies often fol-
low a generalist strategy. They refer to individual benefits
in abstract terms and only indirectly link these to bene-
fits for society. In “Human Enhancement for the Common
Good,” Anton Vedder and Laura Klaming argue that the
moral assessment of enhancement technologies is best not
conducted in such general terms. They argue that instead
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the moral assessment should be focused on specific appli-
cations of medical technologies and the specific purpose
in question. The authors focus on eyewitness memory en-
hancement as such a specific application. They introduce
the concept of “the common good” as a neutral yardstick
to assess the acceptability of such specific enhancement
applications.
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